Privacy through Pseudonymity in Mobile Telephony Systems by Arapinis, Myrto et al.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Privacy through pseudonymity in mobile telephony systems
Citation for published version:
Arapinis, M, Mancini, LI, Ritter, E & Ryan, M 2014, 'Privacy through pseudonymity in mobile telephony
systems'. in 21st Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS'14). The Internet
Society.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Author final version (often known as postprint)
Published In:
21st Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS'14)
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 20. Feb. 2015
Privacy through Pseudonymity
in Mobile Telephony Systems
Abstract—To protect mobile phone from tracking by third
parties, mobile telephony systems rely on periodically chang-
ing pseudonyms. We experimentally and formally analyse the
mechanism adopted to update these pseudonyms and point out
design and implementation weaknesses that defeat its purpose by
allowing the identiﬁcation and/or tracking of mobile telephony
users. In particular, the experiments show that the pseudonym
changing mechanism as implemented by real networks does not
achieve the intended privacy goals. Moreover, we found out that
the standard is ﬂawed and that it is possible to exploit the
procedure used to assign a new pseudonym, the TMSI reallocation
procedure, in order to track users. We propose countermeasures
to tackle the exposed vulnerabilities and formally prove that
the 3GPP standard should require the establishment of a fresh
ciphering key before each execution of the TMSI reallocation
procedure to provide unlinkability.
I. INTRODUCTION
If a third party that eavesdrops on the radio link was able to
identify wireless messages as coming from a particular mobile
phone, he would be able to track the location of the mobile
phone user in real-time. Mobile phone signalling is used for
example by market research companies such as [1], [2] in order
to track the movements of people within a shopping centre.
Contrary to location based service companies, these companies
are tracking bearers of mobile phones in an anonymous way
yet without their consent, without offering them a service,
and sharing the tracking information with parties which have
not previously been agreed with the mobile phone bearers.
Similar tracking techniques could lead to stalking and other
forms of harassment, as well as more mundane invasions of
privacy [3]. In order to prevent this, mobile phone protocols
employ temporary identiﬁers (TMSIs) instead of using long-
term unique identities (IMSIs) to identify mobile phones.
Temporary identities are periodically updated by the network
by means of the TMSI reallocation procedure. To ensure
conﬁdentiality of a newly assigned TMSI, it is transmitted
encrypted using a ciphering key.
Our aim in this paper is to analyse what conditions are
required in order for this arrangement to guarantee user privacy
as intended. In particular, two aspects appear to be important:
1) TMSI reallocation will protect user privacy only if
TMSIs are re-allocated often enough, and at the right
times (e.g., when users move between locations). The
3GPP standard does not rigorously deﬁne the con-
ditions under which TMSI reallocation takes place.
We show that the lack of precise directives permits
implementations which violate user privacy.
2) The success of TMSI reallocation requires that an
attacker with access to the radio channel cannot
link the new TMSI to the old one. Encrypting the
TMSI in the allocation message is necessary but
not sufﬁcient to ensure that. It turns out that other
factors, in particular the use of a fresh encryption
key for each TMSI reallocation, are also necessary to
guarantee unlinkability of old and new TMSIs. The
3GPP standard does not mandate this, again leaving
user privacy subject to choices made by network
operators.
We analyse the TMSI reallocation procedure from both a
formal and an experimental point of view. Our experimental
analysis exposes the adoption by deployed network implemen-
tations of weak policies with respect to privacy and hence are
vulnerable to tracking mobile phone users. We show that the
TMSI reallocation procedure does not provide unlinkability on
most of the analysed mobile networks, because:
1) pseudonyms are not updated frequently;
2) the frequency of updates of pseudonyms does not
depend on the amount of activity exposing them to
tracking adversaries;
3) the same pseudonyms are maintained across different
areas, making users linkable within wide areas;
4) it is possible to mount a replay attack on the TMSI
reallocation procedure.
*** All these issues defeat the objective of introducing TMSIs.
*** Our formal analysis allows us to prove the condition under
which the TMSI reallocation procedure provides unlinkability.
In particular, we formally prove that the establishment of a new
encryption key before each execution of the procedure should
be a mandatory requirement in the standard speciﬁcation.
Our Contributions. We present a formal and an experi-
mental analysis of the subscriber’s privacy in cellular networks
and in particular of the TMSI reallocation procedure. We
highlight deﬁciencies in the standard and show how these
have led to ﬂawed implementations which do not trigger the
reallocation procedure often enough, and when they do they
sometimes allow linkability attacks. Our experimental analysis
reveals some real and novel network scenarios which allow a
third party to violate a user’s privacy despite the reallocation
protocol being used according to the current standard. In
our formal analysis, we prove that the TMSI reallocation
procedure provides unlinkability in case a new ciphering key
is established before each execution of the TMSI reallocation
procedure and we discuss other possible countermeasures. This
proof is one of the few examples in the literature [4], [5]
of a proof of labelled bisimilarity of a real-sized protocol.
Our proof makes use of both manual and automatic proof
techniques.
Terminology. In 3GPP speciﬁcations, mobile phones to-
gether with their SIM card are referred to as mobile stations,
abbreviated MS. Mobile stations have a permanent identity
stored in the SIM card, the International Mobile Subscriber
Identity, abbreviated IMSI. As stated, the serving network (SN)
assigns a temporary identity to an MS, called the Temporary
Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI).
When the network wants to deliver a service to a mobile
station (e.g. an incoming phone call) it sends a paging request
message specifying the identity of the MS (TMSI or IMSI
if the TMSI is not known). The paging request is sent on a
common channel in all the locations most recently visited by
the MS. A MS continuously monitors the common channel
used for paging of the area it is located in. When the MS
receives a paging request, it asks the base station it is attached
to to assign a dedicated channel. The MS the sends a paging
response containing its own identity (usually TMSI) in clear-
text on the dedicated channel.
A. Related Work
Linkability of transactions has been identiﬁed and of-
ten reported by the media as an important threat to user
privacy, in a variety of areas including on-line searches
[6], road usage charging [7], electronic passports [8], and
mobile telephony [3]. The problem of privacy is a multi-
layer/multiprotocol problem [9] which requires all protocols
at all layers to satisfy the desired properties. Moreover,
privacy properties are often violated because of subtle de-
sign/implementation details, hence the need for careful analy-
sis.
Most of the work on security of mobile telephony sys-
tems concerns content-secrecy, integrity and authentication
properties [10], [11], [12]. There are only few formal and
experimental studies concerning the level of usage-privacy
provided to the user by mobile telephony systems. Foo Kune
et al. [13] presented a study on the use of the paging procedure
to locate mobile telephony users. They perform a tracking
attack relying on passive snifﬁng of paging response messages
triggered by placing silent phone calls (obtained by hanging
up before the receiving phone rings) for the victim phone.
This technique allows one to reveal the presence of the victim
in an area monitored by the attacker. Munaut and Nohl [11]
previously outlined a similar technique. They performed a
GSM snifﬁng attack, which allows one to eavesdrop a GSM
phone call by using a modiﬁcation of the osmocom-BB [14]
open source implementation of the GSM protocol stack and an
old Motorola mobile phone. Differently from Foo Kune et al.,
they used a silent SMS to trigger the paging responses needed
to locate the victim. Although these works take advantage of
the fact that a TMSI is allocated for a long time window,
they do not analyse the security and privacy provided by the
TMSI reallocation procedure. Moreover, in order to perform
the attack, the adversary needs to know the mobile number
of the victim. *** Indeed, these attacks consist in establishing
the presence of a target MS in a given location by linking the
target’s telephone number with its TMSI. This attack relies on
the fact that TMSI reallocation is not activity-dependent (as
conﬁrmed by our experiments). This suggests the adoption of
activity dependent reallocation strategies to thwart the attack.
However, we show that reallocating a new TMSI after each
transaction is not sufﬁcient, because (as we experimentally
show) encryption keys are reused in many deployed networks
allowing the replay attack we present. This further privacy
threat cannot be established from Foo Kune et al’s analysis.
We formally prove that establishing fresh keys at each TMSI
reallocation and adopting an activity-dependent reallocation
strategy thwarts Foo Kune et al’s attack. Additionally, we show
that deployed networks do not follow the standard as they do
not all enforce TMSI reallocation at each change of Location
Area. This makes a MS traceable across Location Areas by
simple snifﬁng. This further privacy breach is beyond the scope
of Foo Kune et al’s analysis. So our ﬁndings further contribute
to help improving future developments of this technology. ***
The experiments we carried out show that real networks do not
adopt policies for changing TMSI which are dependent on the
number of exposure of the TMSI over-the-air by the mobile
phone activity and hence they do not tackle these attacks.
Engel showed at the 25C3 conference [15] how network
signalling messages, triggered when sending/receiving SMS
messages, can be used to locate mobile telephony users. He
suggests that network operators should use home routing, i.e.
forwarding through the home network, as a countermeasure to
this SMS tracking attack. This attack requires access to the
intra-network communication infrastructure, which although
possible may require subscription to a pay per query service.
In this work, we analyse the privacy provided by the more
exposed over-the-air communication available to any attacker
with a radio enabled device and do not rely on the less easily
accessible intra-network communication protocols.
The gsmmap project [16], [17] uses a variant of the open
source GSM protocol stack developed within the osmocom-
BB project to assess and visually render on a map the level of
security and privacy provided by network operators across the
world. In particular their aim is to check if network operators
are protecting the users from well known attacks by adopting
countermeasures such as the use of A5/3 encryption, padding
randomization, and full authentication for outgoing calls and
SMS to prevent impersonation and interception, and the use
of regular TMSI updates, and home routing to prevent Engel’s
SMS tracking attack.
The closest work to ours is the one presented in [18]
which also analyses mobile telephony protocols from a privacy
point of view. Arapinis et al. [18] uncover some privacy
attacks on the 3G authentication protocol and on the paging
procedure. These attacks are exposed and exploited through
a real implementation. The authors propose and automatically
verify privacy-friendly ﬁxes of the attacked procedures. The
procedures analysed in [18] are not part of the identity manage-
ment mechanisms of mobile telephony systems, in particular
they do not analyse the TMSI reallocation procedure that is the
procedure on which mobile telephony systems rely to provide
anonymity and unlinkability from third parties. This procedure
is the focus of our work. Moreover, in this work we are
concerned with both issues of the standard speciﬁcations and
issues of the actual implementation by real networks. None
of the issues concerning the identity management and the
pseudonym changing mechanism that we identify in this paper
arise from the analysis presented in [18]. Finally, the proof
methods used in [18] are too weak to prove the correctness
of the TMSI reallocation. We have to create new proof tech-
